I don’t think it matters to my argument, at least. It would be a bit odd, certainly, if essentialism were true but it turned out that the *only* essential properties were relative ones (although, strictly speaking, the standard example of an essential property–a given person’s having been the product of two particular gametes–is a relative one), but I don’t think it makes any odds one way or the other *here*.

“Begonia/ammonia” is ringing a vague bell, but I can’t actualy remember the issue. Can you remind me?

Sorry, I’m too tired to follow this as carefully as I should. But: does it matter if the objects have properties by virtue of the situations they find themselves in rather than independently of the surrounding world? (That is, does it matter if there is some distant possible world in which something had a set of properties only by virtue of the surrounding situation….) If you recall the turn of phrase from Stanford (and you might not remember it) this I think is wrapped up in the “begonia / ammonia” issue, although in this case it is metaphysical rather than biological.

jk